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evant inferences noted. This is, I grant, one reason why logical probabili-
ties are only partially accessible, but not an objection if that is granted. 
The other objection is that, where the ground for the belief in question 
(that P) is not an experience but itself a belief (that J), then the adequacy 
of the grounds for P should not be identified with Prob (P /J) for it also 
depends on the adequacy of J. I fail to see this as an objection. The stan-
dard formula would have it that the adequacy of the ground for P in these 
circumstances is the logical probability Prob (P&J/E) where E is the total, 
or the relevant, experience. 
The third criticism follows from the way that, for good reasons, Alston 
explicates reliability not in terms of known frequency, or even actual fre-
quency, but the frequency in a large run of actual or possible cases (p. 134). 
I interpret him as offering a counterfactual frequency account of reliabil-
ity: what would occur if there were a large number of cases. But, precisely 
because this is a probabilistic situation, there is no fact of the matter as to 
what would occur. So we need an amendment: the reliability of a belief-
forming process is the frequency of truths that would probably occur if 
there were a large number of occurrences of the type of process in ques-
tion. What sort of probability is this though? It cannot itself be analyzed as 
reliability on pain of circularity. And it had better be objective if epistemol-
ogy is to have teeth. It must be logical probability. 
The point of these three criticisms is that we need not despair of a tra-
ditional epistemology, concerned with accessible means to be used when 
the end, truth, is not directly accessible. Within such an epistemology the 
truth-conducive epistemic desiderata, as expounded by Alston, playa 
key role. 
Can God Be Free? by William L. Rowe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004. Pp. vii + 173. $45.00 (Hardback). 
MICHAEL ALMEIDA, University of Texas at San Antonio 
William Rowe's Can God be Free? is a nicely conceived and extremely 
well-written work. The focus on crucial conceptual relations between 
essential perfect goodness, divine freedom, divine responsibility, wor-
ship and praise has occupied Rowe's work for the last twelve years and 
the argumentation in Can Cod Be Free? is subtle and very polished. In 
chapter 1 Rowe provides some background on the famous series of ex-
changes between Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke on divine freedom 
and perfection. But Rowe's main focus in chapter (1) is to rebut Leibniz's 
well-known attempt to reconcile divine perfection and freedom. Leibniz's 
well-known proposal was that God both necessarily and freely actual-
ized the best possible world. Rowe offers an interesting proof that this 
proposal cannot be true. Rowe's response takes the form of a simple two-
premise argument. 
1. If God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, then He 
chooses to create the best possible world. 
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2. God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise, and perfectly good. 
3. Therefore, God chooses to create the best of all possible worlds. 
There is no question that for Leibniz premise (2) is absolutely or meta-
physically necessary. Rowe's main line of argumentation is to show that 
Leibniz is also committed to the absolute necessity of (1). Here's Rowe. 
[I]f we suppose that God chooses to create less than the best ... it 
would logically follow that he is lacking in wisdom, goodness or 
power. Indeed Leibniz says that 'to do less good than one could is 
to be lacking in wisdom or goodness', that the most perfect under-
standing' cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently 
to choose the best' (Theodicy, p. 252) .... What Leibniz says about 
moral necessity implies that (1) is absolutely necessary. For he clearly 
holds that from the fact that a being does less good than it could it 
logically follows that the being in question is lacking in wisdom and 
goodness. And one cannot hold this without being committed to 
holding that the consequent of (1) ... logically follows from the ante-
cedent of (1). (17-18) 
The argument is exactly what we might expect in response to Leibniz's 
proposal. Suppose Rowe is right that (1) and (2) express absolutely nec-
essary propositions. It follows that (3) is also absolutely necessary. But 
importantly it does not follow that God could not have actualized a world 
other than our own. To reach that conclusion Rowe must assume that 
whatever is morally necessary is necessarily morally necessary. In short he 
must assume that the same moral standards (or broader standards, if you 
like) hold in every possible world. Certainly if the same moral standards 
hold in every possible world, then given the absolute necessity of (1) and 
(2), God could not have created a world different from our own. But sup-
pose that moral standards might have been different. The best one can 
do relative to the standards of a mercy world might demand making ex-
ceptions to the requirements of justice. The best one can do relative to a 
justice world might demand no exceptions to the requirements of justice. 
If moral standards vary from world to world then what constitutes the 
best possible world will vary from world to world. There is no absolute 
ordering of worlds from the standpoint of every world. The actual world 
might therefore be the best possible world but not necessarily the best pos-
sible world. But then God might have actualized another. And this seems 
consistent with Leibniz's official position that the Principle of the Best is a 
contingent truth. 
Rowe focuses in chapter 2 on Samuel Clarke, divine perfection and 
freedom. Rowe argues that Clarke's account places severe limitations on 
God's freedom. Here is Rowe. 
Clarke readily sees that were a perfectly good, omniscient being to 
freely choose to do some evil deed, it would thereby cease to be per-
fectly good .... For the free choice to do evil is itself inconsistent with 
continuing to be a perfectly good, omniscient being. A being who 
freely chooses to do what it knows to be an evil deed thereby ceases 
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to be a perfectly good being. So if God were to freely choose to do an 
evil deed, he would cease to be perfectly good. In short, it is not logi-
cally possible for God both to freely choose to do evil and to continue 
to be perfectly good. (p. 26) 
Since God has the traditional attributes of perfect beings Rowe concludes 
that it is impossible that God should choose to perform an evil action. But 
it is not at all clear why Rowe urges that" a being who freely chooses to 
do what it knows to be an evil deed thereby ceases to be a perfectly good 
being"(p. 26). Certainly in ordinary moral contexts no one would make 
EoUch a claim. Suppose a being freely chooses to do what it knows to be an 
evil deed because it necessarily faces a moral dilemma. If an agent neces-
sarily faces a moral dilemma then there is nothing the agent could have 
done to avoid the dilemma. Indeed there is nothing that an omnipotent 
being could have done to avoid the dilemma. The agent must choose some 
wrong action or other. It is difficult to see how the agent's choice might 
nonetheless be blameworthy or how that choice might reflect poorly on 
his character. Since blamelessly choosing to do wrong does not diminish 
moral perfection at all, it cannot be assumed that necessarily a perfect be-
ing does not choose to do wrong. 
Much of the discussion in chapter 3 focuses on how an infinite series of 
possible worlds might be increasingly better on the assumption that God 
necessarily exists and is necessarily infinitely valuable. The focus is pri-
marily on why St. Thomas Aquinas thought so. There is also some much-
needed discussion of the principle of plenitude as an account of value. Are 
worlds better and worse in accordance with the kind and variety of beings 
they contain? Or should a perfect being prefer just the most valuable be-
ings? Nothing definitive on the possibility of infinitely many improving 
worlds is established, as might be expected. But the stage is set for con-
sidering God's freedom under the assumption that for each world in an 
infinite sequence there is a better actualizable world. 
Chapters 4 and 5 consider respectively the subtle defense of compati-
blism in Jonathan Edwards and the much-discussed argument that God 
might create a less-than-best world in Robert M. Adams. The discussion 
leads directly to Rowe's most recent and fascinating work in chapter 6. 
The contemporary debate in chapter 6 considers the possibility that 
God actualizes some world under the No Best World hypothesis. Rowe's 
formulation of the hypothesis states that "for any world creatable by God 
(if he exists) there is a better world he could create instead"(p. 88). The 
basic assumption is that there is an infinite sequence of possible worlds 
and for any possible world in the sequence there is some better actualiz-
able world in the sequence. More precisely for any possible world in the 
sequence wn there is some better world wn+ that an essentially omnipotent, 
essentially omniscient, and necessarily e~isting being (OON) can actual-
ize. The No Best World hypothesis is best formulated in (1). 
1. D(VO)(Vx)(3y)«x < y) & 0(0 actualizes y)) 
The variable 0 has as a domain the (possibly empty) set of OON's. The 
variables x and y have as a domain the set of possible worlds in the infinite 
sequence of worlds and 0 and 0 express logical necessity and possibility. 
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The proposition in (1) does not entail that there are OON's in any world 
and so a fortiori does not entail that there is a perfect being in any world. 
Further (1) does not entail that any being actualizes any possible world 
in the sequence. And (1) is perfectly consistent with the actual world be-
ing the product of pure chance. So there is no strong objection to the No 
Best World hypothesis as formulated in (1). But (1) together with Rowe's 
Principle B entails that an essentially perfectly good being actualizes no 
world in the sequence. Principle B states that necessarily if an omniscient 
being actualizes a world when there is a better world that it could have 
actualized, then that omniscient being is not essentially perfectly good. l 
The proposition expressed in Principle B is (2). 
2. O(\fO)(\fx)«O is essentially perfectly good) & (0 actualizes x)) ::::) 
-(:3y)«x < y) & 0(0 actualizes y)). 
Rowe urges that in addition to (1) and (2) it is also true that a perfect being 
must actualize some world in the sequence. 
3. O(VO)(:3x)«O is essentially perfectly good) ::::) (0 actualizes x)) 
And it does follow from (1)-(3) that it is impossible that there is an essen-
tially perfectly good being. 
4. 0-(:30)(0 is essentially perfectly good) 
Rowe addresses some published objections to this argument from 
Thomas Morris, William Wainwright, Dan and Frances Howard-Snyder 
and William Hasker. And Rowe's responses are in general compelling. But 
there remains a serious problem for Rowe's argument. It is a theorem in 
every normal system of deontic logic that O«OA & OB) ::::) O(A & B)). The 
theorem states that, necessarily, an agent is obligated to do each A and B 
only if the agent can do both A and B. The theorem is considerably stronger 
than the familiar ought-can principle and, more importantly, it is a di-
rect consequence of the thesis that, necessarily, every essentially perfectly 
good being fulfills all of his obligations or O(OA ::J A). And there is no 
question that Rowe endorses O(OA::::) A) as a theorem governing essen-
tially perfectly good beings. 
The problem is that Principle B generates a set of obligations that vio-
late the theorem O«OA & OB) ::J O(A & B). Since no moral principle can 
generate a set of moral obligations that violate any theorem, it follows 
that Principle B must be false. Let Aa, AI' ... , A= express the propositions 
that an essentially perfectly good being actualizes respectively wa' WI' . 
. . , W =' Principle B generates the following set of obligations (0-Aa & 0-
Al & ... & 0- AJ or it is obligatory that an essentially perfectly good 
being does not actualize wa' it is obligatory that an essentially perfectly 
good being does not actualize w] and so on for every world in the se-
quence. Instantiating the theorem we get 0 [(0-Ao & 0- A] & ... & 0-
AJ ::::) O(-Aa & -AI & ... & -AJ]. But it is impossible that an essentially 
perfectly good being fails to actualize every world in the sequence and 
so -O(-Ao & -AI & ... & -AJ. Principle B therefore yields a set of obliga-
tions that violates this theorem. But no moral principle can generate a 
set of obligations that violates a deontic theorem. Therefore, the prin-
ciple is false. 
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One obvious remedy for Rowe is to give priority to his moral prin-
ciple over the theorem O((OA & OB) :=J O(A & B)). But the consequences 
of abandoning this theorem are drastic. First, Rowe would also have to 
abandon the thesis O(OA :=J A).2 But this is just to concede that an essen-
tially perfectly good being might fail to fulfill a moral obligation. Rowe 
would almost certainly not find that consequence acceptable. But matters 
are worse. The theorem O((OA & OB) :=J O(A & B)) is also entailed by the 
familiar axiom that nothing impossible is obligatory OA :=J OA together 
with the closure principle O((OA & OB) :=J O(A & B)). So conceding O(OA 
=J A) is not enough, we have to give up an additional theorem. 
It is less damaging to abandon the closure principle. But in that case no in-
consistency follows from the assumption that an essentially perfectly good 
being has the moral obligations (i) O-Ao& 0- Al & ... & 0- A= and (ii) O(Ao 
v Al v ... v AJ. From (i) it follows that an essentially perfectly good being 
has a moral obligation not to actualize any world in the sequence and from 
(ii) it follows that an essentially perfectly good being has a moral obligation 
to actualize some world or other in the sequence. An essentially perfectly 
good being therefore faces a moral dilemma. Indeed an essentially perfectly 
good being necessarily faces a moral dilemma. But abandoning the closure 
principle entails that moral dilemmas are perfectly possible. So none of this 
entails that there exists no essentially perfectly good beings. 
If there is an infinite sequence of improving worlds then two conclu-
sions are available. Either an essentially perfectly good being must fulfill 
all of its moral obligations (i.e., O(OA :=J A) is a theorem) and Principle B 
is false or Principle B is true and an essentially perfectly good being need 
not fulfill all of its moral obligations. In neither case are we forced to the 
conclusion that there exists no essentially perfectly good being. 
In the final chapter of Can God Be Free? Rowe considers a suggestion 
from Thomas Morris that God is the "delimiter of possible worlds." The 
suggestion promises a solution to many of the problems Rowe advances. 
Perhaps only those worlds are possible that are consistent with the neces-
sary existence of an essentially perfectly good being. If an infinite sequence 
of improving worlds is inconsistent with a perfect being, then there is no 
infinite sequence. And if a best possible world is inconsistent with divine 
freedom, then there are many equally good and unsurpassed worlds. This 
is a solution that Rowe finds appealing, if not entirely satisfactory. But 
the argument for Morris's position is one worth worrying about. If w is a 
possible world that is on-balance bad and God is a necessarily existing, 
essentially perfectly good being, then it is necessarily possible that God 
actualizes w. So the fact that God can actualize w does not diminish God's 
essential perfect goodness unless there is a moral requirement that God do 
the impossible, viz., render himself unable to actualize w. But there can-
not be a moral requirement that God do the impossible. So we might well 
conclude instead that the fact that God can actualize w does not diminish 
God's essential perfect goodness. 
NOTES 
1. Rowe introduces Principle B as stating that if an omniscient being cre-
ates a world when there is a better world it could have created, then it is pos-
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sible that there exists a being morally better than it. (91) But the consequent 
entails that the omniscient being is not essentially perfectly good. And Rowe 
contends that the principle expresses a necessary truth. These modifications 
facilitate presentation of Rowe's argument. 
2. Well, strictly he would have to give up (OA:J A) or (A:J OA). But it is 
hard to imagine anyone contending that some actual states of affairs are also 
impossible. 
Science and the Study of God: A Mutuality Model for Theology and Science, by 
Alan G. Padgett. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. Pp. 224. $22.00 (paper). 
Divine Action and Modern Science, by Nicholas Saunders. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002. Pp. 234. $22.00 (paper). 
PATRICK RICHMOND, St Catharine's College, Cambridge, UK 
These two books deal with the relation of science to theology, one concentrat-
ing more on broad outlines and methodology, the other on a specific topic. 
Both take Christian faith as a given, at least provisionally, and both note that 
Christian faith sees science as investigating God's creation, so science and 
theology are both concerned with understanding the same cosmos. 
Proceeding from this basic perspective, Padgett develops a collegial 
metaphor of mutuality, sketching what he terms" dialectical realism" be-
tween science and theology. Science and theology should both inform and 
be informed by our worldview, our basic framework for life that helps 
us understand the world and motivates our practice as well. Our world-
view can affect the way we interpret the data and conclusions of academic 
disciplines. This "mutuality model" sees science and theology as more 
intimately related than mere dialogue partners but as still distinct and not 
fully integrated academic disciplines. 
Padgett points out that many claims that science and religion are in-
compatible incorrectly assume that science is a world view or that it pre-
supposes a naturalistic worldview. In fact, science arose from a Christian 
intellectual environment: even Galileo was not antireligious. 
Padgett argues for the existence of various levels of explanation, with 
disciplines like history using explanations that presuppose those used in 
the social and physical sciences. Theology likewise includes explanatory 
claims, such as that God somehow explains the existence of the cosmos. 
He argues that in the right circumstances one's worldview, including reli-
gious commitments, can rationally help one choose among various theo-
ries that are equally supported by the data and standards of other disci-
plines. Although the truth must be sought in each science according to the 
traditions of enquiry of that discipline, results in one field may be called 
into question by those in another if they do not cohere, as indeed happens 
amongst the sciences from time to time. 
Next, Padgett argues for "dialectical realism." We learn in a community 
with a history and tradition. As with many post-modem approaches, there 
is a suspicion of grand systems and an attention to the particular and excep-
tional. Padgett also argues for critical realism in both theology and science. 
